Political parties conduct post-election autopsies for one reason: to learn from defeat and chart a path forward.
By that standard, the Democratic National Committee’s long-awaited 2024 autopsy, released at the end of May, has failed spectacularly.
In fact, seemingly the only thing the report did achieve was uniting Democrats across the ideological spectrum in condemnation.
Even DNC Chair Ken Martin, who commissioned and released the report – after months of delays – disavowed it, issuing an apology immediately after it was publicized.
As if to highlight the disaster that the report proved to be, at the top of every page is a disclaimer that “this document reflects the views of the author, not the DNC.”
And the document itself is marked up with corrections and disclaimers that facts are incorrect or that context is missing to the point of being almost illegible.
In that same vein, the disclaimers give the unmistakable impression that Democrats still don’t understand what went wrong in 2024, nor do they know what to fix ahead of 2028.
To that end, this debacle has put Martin’s job in jeopardy – and rightly so – at a critical juncture.
Right after midterms, the party will begin preparing for the 2028 election, but will have to do so with a national committee strapped for cash and with either an embattled leader or a new one.
According to CNN, “multiple past donors to the DNC, which is already in debt…have told Martin they will not write checks because of how he handled the autopsy.”
Worse, the article continued, “Others have clawed back promised donations in their fury.”
Various Democratic personalities such as Dan Pfeiffer and Jon Favreau, senior advisor and speechwriter, respectively, for former President Obama have blasted Martin, demanding he step down.
Similar calls are also coming from within the Beltway. Senator Cory Booker recently told Jake Tapper that “the Democratic Party desperately needs new leadership.”
While the criticism is well deserved, to its credit, the report does make a handful of astute observations that Democrats would be wise not to dismiss.
Indeed, it states that Democrats struggled because they “are trying to win arguments while Republicans are focused on winning elections,” an accurate indictment of Democrats’ tendency to prioritize being “right” over being persuasive.
It also notes that Democrats who outperformed Harris, such as now-North Carolina Gov. Josh Stein, did so because they “focused less on abstract issues and identity politics.”
Instead, they connected “with voters on the issues they say matter most” such as the economy, affordability, and public safety.
Likewise, it correctly points out that Democrats struggled with Latinos, young men, and men of color because the party is “incapable of projecting strength, unity, or leadership.”
It also called out the Harris campaign for failing to respond to perhaps the most effective attack of the campaign: Trump’s “Harris is for they/them, I am for you” ad.
Finally, the autopsy was correct to call out the Biden White House for failing to “position or prepare” Harris.
There was no in-depth polling on her until after Biden announced his decision to withdraw, and the decision to saddle her with the immigration portfolio on day 1 effectively set her up for failure, while making her an easy target for anti-immigration attacks.
That being said, that is largely where the autopsy’s positives end.
Throughout the 192-page report, there is little mention of Biden’s decision to run again, the widespread concerns over the Biden’s age, or the controversial no-primary process used to elevate Harris, three absolutely critical factors in the election.
In no uncertain terms, the absence of those issues is bewildering, erodes the entire report’s credibility, and demands an explanation.
Similarly, as has been pointed out by multiple publications, there was no discussion of Democrats’ struggles to navigate the war between Israel and Hamas in Gaza – the words “Israel” or “Gaza” do not even appear once.
The approach of both Biden and then Harris to this issue angered progressives, prompting many to vote for third parties in numbers that may have made the difference in swing states like Michigan.
Lastly, the report did absolutely nothing to soothe the battle between progressives and moderates. Either side could read the report and reasonably conclude that Democrats lost because they were dragged too far left or, for progressives, not far enough left.
To be sure, the full impact of the autopsy and its botched roll out likely won’t be seen in 2026. Between historical precedent favoring the party out of power and President Trump’s approval ratings sitting at just 39% approve and 55% disapprove per Emerson.
Democrats also still lead the general congressional ballot by 8-points per RealClearPolitics average.
Further, political betting site Kalshi gives them a 77% chance to retake the House and a 43% chance to take both the House and Senate, almost double Republicans’ chances of keeping both chambers.
Rather, the key consequences of the autopsy will likely play out in 2028, an even more critical election as the White House is up for grabs and Trump is no longer on the ballot.
The party’s losses with Hispanic, working class, and young voters – men in particular – will not magically heal themselves if Democrats lack a coherent identity, agenda, and messaging strategy.
Recent Pew Research polling has shown that just 39% of Americans have a favorable view of the Democratic Party, 20-points underwater.
Against that backdrop, the autopsy and how it was handled is not merely an organizational embarrassment. It is evidence of a party lacking institutional self-awareness to conduct an honest reckoning of why it lost.
Ultimately, a party that cannot manage its own post-mortem without provoking near-universal condemnation is not yet a party that has shown itself capable of making the affirmative case for why voters should hand them the White House in 2028.
Douglas Schoen is a longtime Democratic political consultant.