President Donald Trump has again delayed his threats to send Iran “back to the stone ages,” accepting a Pakistan-proposed ceasefire extension on April 21. The apparent extension, while flawed given the U.S. blockade of Iranian ports and new Iranian strikes on international shipping in the Strait of Hormuz in response, reflects the precarity of the current situation. However, when coupled with the so-called “ceasefire” in Lebanon that was effectively forced on Israel, a critical dynamic presents itself: a divergence of American and Israeli interests in this regional war.
The decision to again step back from the abyss is wise. Any return to attacks that have caused widespread civilian harm would have produced additional violations of international humanitarian law and war crimes. It would have further hardened Tehran’s desire to make this war as painful as possible for the parties involved and the region more broadly, worsening the international economic downturn and the widespread death of civilians defining the conflict.
The wild card, however, remains Israel. Both the United States and Israel depict the war as existential and easily winnable, but pre-existing strategic divergence could now be widening for the better. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu wants the Islamic Republic’s disintegration, whereas Trump, possibly satisfied with tactical success in Iran, may desire any graceful exit. He should take it.
Iran views this war as existential, assessing that painfully drawing out the conflict can prevent another return to fighting. Indeed, as numerous analysts have noted, Tehran merely needs to survive to “win” this war. It has increasingly pressured energy markets and its neighbors through attrition tactics to do so.
Thus, Tehran follows a clear escalatory ladder: as Tel Aviv and Washington increasingly struck critical targets across Iran, it hit Hormuz shipping and regional energy infrastructure. While not purely reactionary, the Islamic Republic’s strategy signals that escalation faces escalation. For Iran, long-term pain inflicted upon it – such as recent strikes on civilian infrastructure and its industrial base – will foster the same pain for the Gulf, region, and world.
In this context, Washington’s control of the conflict is challenged by the fact that Israel and Iran get votes on the war’s direction. Consider the start of the original 2-week ceasefire. While the U.S. signaled de-escalation, Israel – a supposed partner with which there is “no daylight” – escalated against Lebanon, daring Iran to respond in kind. Thus, the Israeli government is playing spoiler to any effort to end the fighting, as it has in the past.
The ceasefire extension could reflect the Trump administration’s interest in ending this war quickly, given upcoming midterm elections. Both the White House and Iran understand that the American public does not support this war. It is even less supportive of any risky boots-on-the-ground scenario that would produce more American casualties while deepening the quagmire.
In an ideal scenario, the ceasefire extension gives Trump more time to de-escalate from his dangerous rhetorical threats, reframing his illegal war of choice as a “win.” At worst, it gives his administration time to regain the upper hand, as the blockade may have been intended to achieve.
Indeed, with Iran’s refusal to end hostilities on unfavorable terms and willingness to fight to the end, alongside Israel’s belligerence and desire to disintegrate the Iranian state, risks of further escalation remain. In this context, Trump lost control of the war in its early days. The ceasefire and its extension offer an opportunity to regain control and end the fighting.
Israel’s bellicosity in conducting a bloody regional conflict for over two years presents a challenge. The case of Lebanon constitutes another major question mark in this regard, given Tehran demands a region-wide end to the fighting and understanding Israel’s past actions during ceasefires, in which it has attempted to separate deals from other war fronts. This dynamic is playing out, with the supposed ceasefire agreement granting Israel the right to continue strikes on Hezbollah in the country.
Given Iran’s regional demands, the Trump administration should further rein in Netanyahu’s government, ending Israel’s region-wide strikes. While Netanyahu wants to spoil talks through Lebanon, he will struggle to refuse Trump’s request, just as he did in the past when the Lebanon ceasefire was clearly traded for relative calm in the Strait of Hormuz. Thus, the question is one of political will and focus in Washington.
In parallel, Washington should consider real concessions to Tehran, given Trump’s decision to strike the Islamic Republic twice amid prior negotiations. Addressing such concerns will require sanctions relief and a framework on Hormuz. A non-aggression pact is likely also necessary. If talks collapse, the Trump administration should not resume military operations, accepting a cold peace. The alternative would trap the United States in the same quagmire while returning Iran and Israel to the driver’s seat.
The reality is that the United States cannot permanently end this war without making bold decisions that leave no party satisfied but that offer guarantees to permanently end the fighting. Ultimately, this approach advances real U.S. interests – avoiding foreign wars in the Middle East – and saves innocent life on all sides.
Alexander Langlois is a Contributing Fellow at Defense Priorities.